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cent of building contracts. If they should finance more than ninety per
cent, they would be in no worse shape than subcontractors are after the
decision in W & W Floor, for they could still collect a personal judgment
against the owner on the note for the remaining ten per cent. Further, they
are in a better position than subcontractors to put pressure on principal
contractors to execute bond agreements in their contracts with owners and
thus still safely finance one hundred per cent. In the final analysis, the
policy of providing adequate protection to subcontractors should outweigh
the difficulty, if any, with the law of negotiable instruments.
Finding authority to grant personal judgments in the language of article
5463 is the least strained interpretation of the statute, and more than
likely will be found inoffensive to the constitution. Should, however, per-
sonal judgments not be authorized by the statutes, or if authorized de-
clared unconstitutional, the need of subcontractors for liens will be height-
ened, for denying them liens will often reduce their protection from little
to none.
Hugh T. Blevins
Occupant's Duty To Warn Employee of Independent
Contractor Discharged by Warning the
Independent Contractor
Will Ray Henry, an employee of an independent contractor, the Roy
Vickers Lease Service, was severely burned on premises controlled by the
Delhi-Taylor Oil Corporation.' Delhi-Taylor had employed the inde-
pendent contractor to extend casings on sixteen pipelines passing under a
private roadway.2 In negotiating the contract with Vickers, Delhi-Taylor's
representative had warned both Vickers and his superintendent-foreman'
that they should treat all the pipelines "as if they were under pressure"
and "as though they were loaded" 4 (i.e., that the lines were dangerous and
could be carrying flammable material). After a large and deep ditch was
dug to expose some of the pipelines and while Henry was engaged in
welding operations in the ditch, a dragline operator excavating the ditch
punctured a pipeline.' This pipe contained toluene, a highly flammable
' The land was owned by the Columbia Southern Corporation. Delhi-Taylor owned an ease-
ment through this land for the purpose of running its pipelines underground from its refinery to
docks on the coast a few miles distant.
' The sixteen pipelines varied from two to sixteen inches in diameter and were buried at depths
varying from four inches to ten feet. To extend the casings around each of the pipelines simply
means placing a larger pipe around each pipeline so that any of the pipelines could be removed
from under the roadway at any time without disturbing the road material.
3 Hereinafter called superintendent.
4Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Henry, 416 S.W.2d 390, 393 (Tex. 1967).
' The punctured pipe was unexposed by the ditch and lay a few inches beneath the ground. The
question was raised by Delhi-Taylor whether Henry's injury was caused by the negligence, if not
the sole negligence, of the independent contractor's employee. The jury found the dragline operator,
a fellow-servant of Henry, to be free of negligence.
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liquid similar to gasoline. The liquid, which was under static pressure,"
spurted from the pipe and was ignited when it entered the ditch and came
in contact with Henry's welding torch. Henry sued the occupant Delhi-
Taylor for damages caused by the failure to warn him personally of the
dangerous condition. It was, however, stipulated by the parties that a
warning had been given to the independent contractor, Vickers. The trial
court rendered judgment for Henry, and the court of civil appeals af-
firmed.7 Held, reversed: An adequate warning to an independent contrac-
tor or his superintendent concerning hidden defects on the premises dis-
charges the occupant's duty to warn the independent contractor's em-
ployees. The court further stated that in future cases full knowledge alone
by the independent contractor, without any warning, will likewise relieve
the occupant from liability to the employee. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v.
Henry, 416 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1967).
I. DUTY OF AN OCCUPANT AND AN EMPLOYER
In Texas the occupant' of land has an affirmative duty to keep his prem-
ises in a reasonably safe condition for invitees.9 The occupant is charged
with this duty because of his control and superior knowledge of the land"
and because of the benefit conferred on him by the invitee. The standard
applied to determine the existence of the duty is objective: whether the
occupant knew, or as a reasonably prudent person should have known, of
any unsafe conditions on his premises. 1 To fulfill this standard the occu-
pant must exercise ordinary care to inspect the premises for dangerous
conditions."5 If hidden dangers of which the invitee is unaware" are pres-
ent on the premises, the occupant must take reasonable precautions to pro-
tect the invitee from these hidden dangers or to warn him thereof. 4 The
occupant has discharged his duty and is relieved from liability whenever
he eliminates the hidden danger or warns the invitee of its existence. If
there are open and obvious dangers known to the invitee or of which he is
0 Static pressure is the pressure created entirely by the weight of the liquid. The pipeline from
the refinery to the dock ran downhill. When the pump was shut off, the valve at the dock was
closed causing the pipeline to remain full of toluene.
'Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Henry, 403 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
8 The term occupant refers to both an owner and an occupier of land.
'An invitee is defined as a person who goes on the premises of another in answer to the ex-
press or implied invitation of the owner or occupant on the business of the owner or the occupant
or for their mutual advantage. Texas Power & Light Co. v. Holder, 385 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964), error ref. n.r.e. A servant or employee of another person (i.e., an independent con-
tractor), who enters the premises on the business of his master, in which business the master and
the owner or occupant have a mutual interest, occupies the status of invitee. Snelling v. Harper,
137 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), error dismissed, judgment correct. Therefore, both the
independent contractor and his employee are invitees.
"Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 235 S.W.2d 609 (1950); Smith v. Henger, 148
Tex. 456, 226 S.W.2d 425 (1950); Walgreen-Texas Co. v. Shivers, 137 Tex. 493, 154 S.W.2d
625 (1941).
11 Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963).
1
21d.; Genell, Inc. v. Flynn, 163 Tex. 632, 358 S.W.2d 543 (1962); Smith v. Henger, 148 Tex.
456, 226 S.W.2d 425 (1950).
" The invitee must be unaware of the dangerous condition, or the doctrine of "no duty" would
apply, and the occupant would owe the invitee no duty. There is "no duty" to warn a person of
things he already knows.
"
4 Western Auto Supply Co. v. Campbell, 373 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. 1963); Halepeska v. Callihan
Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963); Genell, Inc. v. Flynn, 163 Tex. 632, 358 S.W.2d
543 (1962); Smith v. Henger, 148 Tex. 456, 226 S.W.2d 425 (1950).
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charged with knowledge, Halepes/za v. Callihan Interests, Inc."a says the
occupant owes "no duty" to warn or to protect the invitee.
The fact that an occupant may be imposed with the duty to protect or
warn an invitee in no way alters the relationship between an independent
contractor and his employees when an independent contractor is hired to
do work on an occupant's land. The relationship between the independent
contractor and his employees is that of master and servant. The employer
owes a duty to use ordinary care to warn his employees of any dangers on
the premises, incident to their work, and of which the employer is aware."
At common law a suit against the employer for injuries caused by a breach
of this duty was subject to the defenses of contributory negligence, as-
sumption of risk and the fellow-servant doctrine. However, today the
suit would be controlled by the Workmen's Compensation Act,' and
these defenses would no longer defeat the employee's injury claim."
II. OCCUPANT'S DUTY To WARN EMPLOYEES OF
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
Although it was clear that an independent contractor owed his em-
ployee a duty to warn of any dangerous conditions existing on the prem-
ises, not until 1924 in Galveston-Houston Electric Railway v. Reinle" did
the Texas Supreme Court decide whether an occupant also had a duty to
warn personally employees of the independent contractor. In that case an
employee of an independent contractor was electrocuted when a boom
which he was operating came into contact with an uninsulated high-
voltage wire. The supreme court held that it was the duty of the occupant
to give the employee notice or warning of the danger. This duty existed
even though the independent contractor had full knowledge of the danger
and also owed an independent duty to warn the employee of the danger.
The reason the occupant was held liable was that he knew that the nature
of the work to be performed by the independent contractor required
workmen to be exposed to dangerous conditions on the premises. The court
stated that an occupant for his own advantage cannot invite others on
15 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963). The supreme court in Delhi-Taylor never mentioned the "no
duty" doctrine discussed in Halepeska presumably because the dangerous condition in Delhi-Taylor
was hidden, not open and obvious. Furthermore, the issue was never raised by either counsel in
their briefs. Plaintiff Henry seemed to be insufficiently aware of the circumstances to be charged
with the knowledge of the hidden danger. However, assuming Henry was an experienced welder
of petroleum pipelines, would not such experience be sufficient to charge him with the knowledge
of the hidden danger so as to invoke the "no duty" doctrine even though the danger was hidden
and not open and obvious? An invitee should not recover if he is as legally aware of the danger as
the occupant.
The two cases can also be distinguished in that Halepeska caused the injury to himself, while
Henry was injured by no fault of his own. But this should not matter because in Delhi-Taylor
the third party was found to be not negligent, so no intervening causation is possible. Delhi-Taylor
is a case illustrative of the recent trend away from the "no duty" doctrine of Halepeska.
"0Frontier Theatres Inc. v. Brown, 362 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), rev'd on other
grounds, 369 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1963); Harmon v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 324 S.W.2d 92 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1959), error ref. n.r.e.; City of Austin v. Johnson, 195 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App.
1946), error ref. n.r.e.
'
7 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 8306-09 (1967).
181d. art. 8306, § 1.
'9113 Tex. 456, 258 S.W. 803 (1924).
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premises under his control without using proper care to warn of dangers
of which the invitee is not aware. The occupant, while retaining control
of the premises, cannot escape the duty to warn by attempting to delegate
it to the independent contractor.
The duty to warn, however, is not imposed when the owner of land has
no control over the premises."' When the owner puts some other person in
control of the premises, such person (e.g., an independent contractor) as-
sumes the duty to keep the premises under his control in safe condition.21
Thus, a general contractor in control of premises owes to employees of a
subcontractor a duty similar to that owed by an occupant to an employee
of an independent contractor."
A distinction must be made between the occupant's liability to the em-
ployee of an independent contractor when the injury is caused by a danger
inherent in the premises and the occupant's liability when the injury is
caused by the sole negligence of the independent contractor. The occupant
in the latter situation is not liable, because he has no control over the con-
duct of the independent contractor." In the former situation the occupant
is liable because a duty is imposed by law to protect those persons invited
on the premises." Before the decision in the Delhi-Taylor case, if both the
occupant and the independent contractor knew of the danger and failed
to warn the independent contractor's employee, they were concurrently
liable' because all persons whose acts contribute to an injury are liable, and
the negligence of one does not excuse the negligence of the others."
III. CHANGES MADE BY DELHI-TAYLOR v. HENRY
The old adage that the law changes with the times is reflected in the
case of Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Henry." Today more specialization is
present in fields occupied by independent contractors than was true when
Reinle was decided. The independent contractor and a few of his employees
no longer perform the work. Instead they are aided by other subcontrac-
tors: electricians, plumbers, carpenters, technicians and various other spe-
cialists. Obviously impressed with this change in circumstances, the su-
preme court in Delhi-Taylor expressly overruled Reinle, noting that to im-
"°McKee v. Patterson, 153 Tex. 517, 271 S.W.2d 391 (1954); Nance Exploration Co. v.
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 305 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957), error ref. n.r.e. (no control,
therefore no duty).
21Smith v. Henger, 148 Tex. 456, 226 S.W.2d 425 (1950).
22 McKee v. Patterson, 153 Tex. 517, 271 S.W.2d 391 (1954); Smith v. Henger, 148 Tex.
456, 226 S.W.2d 425 (1950); Texas Elec. Serv. Co. v. Holt, 249 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Civ. App.
1952), error ref. n.r.e.
2 Union Tank & Supply Co. v. Kelley, 167 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1948); Galveston-Houston
Elec. Ry. v. Reinle, 113 Tex. 456, 258 S.W. 803 (1924); Nance Exploration Co. v. Texas Em-
ployers' Ins. Ass'n, 305 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957), error ref. n.r.e.
24Galveston-Houston Elec. Ry. v. Reinle, 113 Tex. 456, 258 S.W. 803 (1924). But, an em-
ployee of an independent contractor is not a "third person" within the rule that an occupant is
liable to third persons for the negligence of the independent contractor in the performance of
work that is inherently dangerous.
25 Sun Oil Co. v. Kineten, 164 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1947).
20Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1962); DeWinne v. Allen, 154 Tex. 316, 277
S.W.2d 95 (1955).
27416 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1967).
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pose upon the occupant the duty to warn every employee of an independ-
ent contractor who might come on the premises is an impossible burden,
because independent contractors employ scores of employees and their
identities change daily."s
In holding that an adequate warning to an independent contractor or
his superintendent discharges the duty of the occupant to warn an em-
ployee of the independent contractor," the court was influenced by the
argument that the occupant should not be required to foresee and antici-
pate that the independent contractor will not discharge his duty to warn
his employee." As a general rule of law, a person is not bound to anticipate
negligent or unlawful conduct on the part of another." But the abstract
statement that one may assume that others will act in a lawful and non-
negligent manner is, because of its generality, misleading. Though a person
is not bound to anticipate unlawful or negligent conduct by others, he is
nevertheless under a duty to use ordinary care to prevent injury to an-
other." Even after the occupant has warned the independent contractor of
the particular danger, the occupant may still owe the employee a duty to
warn the employee personally if the occupant actually sees the employee
in danger and realizes from the situation that the independent contractor
has not communicated the warning given him by the occupant. But even
if this duty is imposed upon the occupant, to prove its breach is a difficult
task for two reasons: (1) under the test formulated by the supreme court,
the occupant may reasonably assume that the independent contractor
communicated the warning, and (2) factual situations will seldom permit
the occupant to determine adequately whether the employee has been per-
sonally warned of the danger. This is demonstrated by Delhi-Taylor. Even
if the occupant had actually observed Henry perform his job prior to his
injury, it would be difficult for a reasonable man to say Henry had not
been warned by the independent contractor and therefore was in danger
of injury.
Before concluding that the occupant's warning to the independent con-
tractor discharged the occupant's duty to the employee, the court was
faced with the question of the adequacy of a particular warning. The
28 Also supporting the decision is the fact that the term independent contractor implies the
right for the independent contractor to employ as few or as many employees as he may see fit
and generally to perform the duties of the work without intervention from the occupant.
2"The decision reached by the supreme court is supported by Texas court of civil appeals
cases: Tyler v. McDaniel, 386 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), error 'ref. n.r.e.; Nance Ex-
ploration Co. v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 305 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957), error ref.
n.r.e.; Texas Elec. Serv. Co. v. Holt, 249 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952), error ref. n.r.e. Fifth
Circuit cases likewise support the decision: Turner v. West Texas Util. Co., 290 F.2d 191 (5th
Cir. 1961); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Bivins, 276 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1960). The Delhi-Taylor decision
is also supported by cases from other jurisdictions: Bakovich v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.,
45 Il. App. 2d 182, 195 N.E.2d 260 (1963); Levesque v. Fraser Paper Ltd., 159 Me. 131, 189
A.2d 375 (1963); Hunt v. Laclede Gas Co., 406 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. 1966); Storm v. New York
Tel. Co., 270 N.Y. 103, 200 N.E. 659 (1936); Schwarz v. General Elec. Realty Corp., 163 Ohio
St. 354, 126 N.E.2d 906 (1955); Grace v. Henry Disston & Sons, 369 Pa. 265, 85 A.2d 118
(1952).
"Tyler v. McDaniel, 386 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), error ref. n.r.e.; Texas Elec.
Serv. Co. v. Holt, 249 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952), error ref. n.r.e.; Storm v. New York
Tel. Co., 270 N.Y. 103, 200 N.E. 659 (1936).
S'DeWinne v. Allen, 154 Tex. 316, 277 S.W.2d 95 (1955).
"Owens v. Acme Oil Co., 408 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), error ref. n.r.e.
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warning which an occupant must communicate to an invitee must be suf-
ficient to put the invitee on guard concerning the particular danger in-
volved. Knowledge alone by the invitee is not enough. There must be
knowledge of the danger involved and the appreciation of the danger.'
The invitee must be in a position to make an intelligent choice concerning
whether to encounter the particular danger." Thus, the function of the
warning is to give the invitee knowledge and an opportunity to appreciate
the danger so that he can decide whether to confront it. The supreme
court in Delhi-Taylor held that the warning to treat the pipelines "as
though they were loaded" was sufficient to inform the independent con-
tractor of the danger and, therefore, adequate. But the court felt the
warning was adequate only "when considered with their [the independent
contractor's and his superintendent's] knowledge of the premises and the
dangers inherent therein."" The warning was undeniably a weak one, and
probably the same result would have been reached even if no warning had
been communicated. Because of the knowledge already possessed by the in-
dependent contractor and his superintendent," the warning did not apprise
them of anything that they should not have already presumed to be true.
One weakness in the supreme court's warning test is that there is no
assurance the employee will ever know about the danger. An alternative
test to determine if the occupant's duty to warn is discharged would add
an additional factor. Under this test, the warning will be deemed adequate
only when the occupant can reasonably believe that the warning given the
independent contractor will ultimately be communicated to the individual
employee. If so, the occupant has discharged his duty to protect this par-
ticular invitee from harm.a" Although such a test would give more assur-
ance that the employee will become aware of the danger, it is obviously
difficult to apply.
After deciding that an adequate warning was given and that commun-
ication to either the independent contractor or his superintendent dis-
charged the occupant's duty to the independent contractor's employee,
the court stated that in future cases full knowledge alone by the inde-
pendent contractor (no matter how obtained) will discharge the occu-
pant's duty to warn the employee. This is true even though the occupant
may not have used ordinary care for the safety of the employee. The court
failed to include full knowledge on the part of the independent contrac-
tor's superintendent, but the court surely intended to include the super-
intendent's full knowledge since one of the cases cited in support of the
court's holding was such a situation."8
"'Ellis v. Moore, 401 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. 1966); Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371
S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963); Dee v. Parish, 160 Tex. 171, 327 S.W.2d 449 (1959); McKee v. Patter-
son, 153 Tex. 517, 271 S.W.2d 391 (1954).
"
4 Triangle Motors v. Richmond, 152 Tex. 354, 258 S.W.2d 60 (1953).
aSDelhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Henry, 416 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1967).
"' The superintendent had previously done a job for the Delhi-Taylor Oil Corporation and had
had seventeen years experience working around loaded pipelines. According to the superintendent,
the precautions to be taken when working around pipelines are standard, i.e., any existing line is
assumed to be loaded.
"'Gulf Oil Corp. v. Bivins, 276 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1960) (dissent).




Delhi-Taylor substantially affects the remedy which an injured employee
is likely to choose. Under the facts Henry had a valid claim through his
employer for workmen's compensation, even though a fellow-servant's
(the dragline operator's) negligence might have contributed to Henry's
injury. " Moreover, his employer was the only possible subscriber to work-
men's compensation, for the Workmen's Compensation Act excepts inde-
pendent contractors and their employees from coverage by the occupant.'
Thus, Henry had to choose whether to sue the occupant for negligence or
his employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act, because an election
to sue the occupant rather than the subscriber makes workmen's compen-
sation unavailable.4' The decision reached in Delhi-Taylor greatly reduces
the occupant's liability to an employee of an independent contractor, and
in effect leaves the employee with only his rights under the Workmen's
Compensation laws.
However, on the positive side, the decision in the instant case relieves
the occupant of the burdensome responsibilities which he previously owed
to employees of independent contractors. No longer will the failure to
warn each employee of latent defects result in the occupant's liability if
the independent contractor knows of the danger. An adequate warning to,
or full knowledge by, the independent contractor or his superintendent
will discharge the occupant's duty to warn. Thus the occupant is able to
discharge his duty by five different ways: (1) warning the independent
contractor; (2) warning the independent contractor's superintendent; (3)
warning the employee himself; (4) full knowledge by the independent
contractor (no warning given); and (5) full knowledge by the independ-
ent contractor's superintendent (no warning given). When the superin-
tendent alone is warned or he alone has knowledge of the danger, this
knowledge is imputed to the independent contractor.
Delhi-Taylor is well supported by decisions from other jurisdictions"'
which have decided the issue, and it will probably be subsequently applied
to the situation where a general contractor has control of the premises and
is under a similar duty to warn the employees of subcontractors of hid-
den dangers.
Michael M. Gibson
9 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (1967).4 Id.; Bridwell v. Bernard, 159 S.W.2d 981 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942), error ref. n.r.e.
41TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, S 6a (1967); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Bran-
don, 126 Tex. 636, 89 S.W.2d 982 (1936); Employers' Indem. Corp. v. Felter, 277 S.W. 376
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1925); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Fish, 266 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App.
1954), error ref. n.r.e.
"a See note 29 supra.
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